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This document introduces a novel access control 
architecture for publicly accessible wireless overlay net-
works. The architecture is designed to address the prob-
lems of ubiquitous Internet service provisioning within 
the city of Lancaster. 
The proposed access control mechanism is based on 
the concepts of secure user authentication, packet mark-
ing, and network-level packet filtering. The novelty of the 
architecture lies in its use of micro-cellular layer three 
networks to acquire fine grained access control in a link 
independent manner. 
The paper describes the concepts behind the access 
control architecture and demonstrates to what extent it 
addresses the security, performance and extensibility 
concerns of public access packet switched wireless 
networks. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This document proposes a novel access control archi-
tecture for a wireless network currently being deployed 
around the city centre of Lancaster.  
A foundation for the network infrastructure has been 
laid during the GUIDE project [1,2,3], a four year 
research effort that developed a tourist guide system 
allowing visitors to explore the historic city led by an 
electronic guide. The wireless GUIDE terminal informs 
the user about the city and its attractions, creates person-
alised tours based on the user’s interests, helps users to re-
orientation themselves when they are lost, and further 
provides access to a range of simple interactive services 
(such as messaging, ticket booking, reservation services, 
etc.).  
More recently in the second phase of the GUIDE 
project [4], the system is evolved farther to promote a 
sense of community among users of the system (for 
example, users are made aware of the actions, views and 
recommendations of other users). 
The challenge of the GUIDE II project is to “open up” 
the network and provide general-purpose, ubiquitous 
services and applications (including public Internet 
access) to citizens. As a side-effect of providing connec-
tivity to the general public, we hope to encourage the 
active involvement of a wider community of users in our 
mobile systems research.  
Since the deployment of wireless network technologies 
in public places bears the danger of unauthorized people 
gaining physical access to the network, it is important to 
be able to restrict access to the network only to authorized 
systems (and users). Therefore, secure user authentication 
and authorisation, and a reliable access control mecha-
nism is vital – particularly for wireless LANs, where the 
absence of comprehensive security provision has been a 
hindrance to its widespread adoption. 
The deployment of the network infrastructure for 
GUIDE II and the development of innovative mobile 
services for the general public will directly interact with 
the recently formed Mobile IPv6 Testbed collaboration 
between Cisco Systems, Microsoft Research, Orange and 
Lancaster University [5]. 
The remainder of this document is structured as 
follows: In the next section we discuss the requirements of 
our access control architecture. Section 3 describes the 
basic network infrastructure and the access control 
mechanism proposed by our architecture. Section 4 
discusses the implementation status and outlines the main 
architectural choices. In section 5 we introduce relevant 





The requirements for our access control architecture 
are primarily imposed by the research objectives of 
GUIDE II and the Mobile IPv6 Testbed, and the setting of 
the network infrastructure around Lancaster. 
As a result, we have derived the following require-
ments for our access control architecture: 
Mobility – Without doubt mobility is the focal aspect of 
our research within the Mobile IPv6 Testbed and 
GUIDE II. It is therefore crucial to design the access 
control architecture for a highly mobile network envi-
ronment, where users frequently roam between wire-
less cells and networks. 
Security – As the wireless network infrastructure is 
publicly available throughout large parts of the city 
centre, a secure access control mechanism is required 
to restrict services to authorised users only. In addi-
tion, the access control architecture must protect the 
network against internal and external security threats 
(for example, denial-of-service attacks). 
Flexibility – One of the key requirements is flexibility. As 
we cannot foresee yet what services will be developed 
within the course of the Mobile IPv6 Testbed 
research, we require a maximum on flexibility for the 
access control approach (for example, to support 
different granularities of control and a broad spec-
trum of access policies). 
Extensibility – The access control architecture must be 
extensible to enable the integration of additional 
functionality or interaction with value-added services 
(such as accounting, QoS, etc.) in the future. 
Transparency – The access control approach must be 
fully transparent to correspondent nodes (i.e., hosts to 
which a mobile node is conversing) external to our 
mobile network in order to ensure full interoperability 
with the standard Internet. 
Usability – User access to the public network infrastruc-
ture should be as easy as possible (i.e., simple instal-
lation of software at the beginning and continued ease 
of use). 
Scalability – The size of a public network spanning the 
city centre of Lancaster demands a scalable access 
control architecture in terms of number of users and 
end-terminals. 
Manageability – In order to facilitate the manageability 
of user accounts and access policies, a comprehensive 
management system is required. The access control 
architecture should also be fairly universal (i.e., inde-
pendent from the underlying technologies) to provide 
a uniform solution across the whole network (avoid-






3. Access Control Architecture 
 
3.1. Network Infrastructure 
 
The Mobile IPv6 Testbed is constructed along the 
wireless overlay network concept [6,7], whereby a number 
of different wireless technologies (such as HSCSD, GPRS 
and Bluetooth) are used in combination with the GUIDE 
infrastructure (based on IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs), in 
order to provide the coverage and network performance 
required for future network services. This approach was 
chosen for two reasons. Firstly, it ensures that mobile 
users maintain access to network resources wherever and 
whenever possible, as the most appropriate interconnect 
can be chosen at any given time. Secondly, it is likely to 
better emulate the network topology of future public 
access wireless networks – thus providing us with a more 
realistic test environment. 
Although many of the wireless technologies that will 
likely make up future overlay networks already have some 
form of access control (for example, WEP in 802.11 [8] 
or RLC/MAC in GPRS [9]), those access control mecha-
nisms are often quite distinct from each other. As the 
Testbed is formed from a range of such layer 2 network 
technologies, the access control mechanism must therefore 
be independent of those underlying network types. The 
Testbed addresses this problem by adopting a layer 3 
approach to access control. 
 
Figure 1.  Access control infrastructure proposed for 
the wireless network deployed around Lancaster city. 
The logical network infrastructure for our wireless 
network is illustrated in Figure 1. As can be seen from the 
diagram, the network is formed from a number of over-
lapping wireless cells, consisting of a variety of technol-
ogy ‘flavours’. Adjacent cells of the same flavour can be 
merged together using layer two bridging in order to form 
a cell with a larger footprint. Although bridging is an 
effective means to interconnect a small number of 
homogenous cells, it is well understood that such archi-
tectures do not scale. In addition, when the case of a 
mobile device crossing between different flavours of net-
work is considered, it becomes apparent that bridging 
provides little support. In order to address these issues, the 
Testbed network places layer 3 administrative boundaries 
between cells of different flavours, and optionally 
between cells of the same flavour. These boundaries sepa-
rate logical areas of administrative control, called 
districts. 
Each district within the Testbed consists of one IPv6 
(sub-)network. IPv6 was chosen as the preferred layer 3 
protocol for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is widely 
accepted that IPv6 is likely to play a key role in future 
generation wireless networks, at the LAN, MAN and 
WAN level. Choosing IPv6 will provide us with an insight 
into the problems which may be encountered when 
deploying such a network, again, giving us a more real-
istic testbed. Secondly, IPv6 provides a number of 
features which make the deployment and management of 
such a network far simpler. Namely, these are the 
increased address space offered by IPv6 (allowing for a 
more scalable solution both in terms of number of users 
and network cells), the support for host auto-configura-
tion, IPsec and mobility. These points are further elabo-
rated throughout this document.  
As can be seen from Figure 1, each district within the 
Testbed is served by an access router. This access router 
is directly responsible for the management of that district, 
such as IPv6 routing, access control and billing. Access 
routers are interconnected and linked back to the campus 
backbone via a wired infrastructure, using SDH, DSL or 
over point-to-point microwave links. 
As one of the aims of the Testbed is to evaluate what 
role such access points will have in future networks and 
what services they will provide, it is extremely important 
to make access routers as flexible and extensible as pos-
sible. For this reason, we develop our access point using a 
high performance component based active network plat-
form, namely LARA++ [10]. The access control and 
router management functions are implemented as 
LARA++ active services. 
 
3.1.1. Scalability. The use of individually managed IPv6 
based cells gives many scalability advantages. Primarily, 
as there is a vast expanse of available IPv6 address space, 
it is perfectly feasible to uniquely address each cell within 
the Testbed as a separate IPv6 network, and still maintain 
enough space for millions of users per cell. This level of 
scalability would be difficult to achieve with IPv4, even 
through the use of network address translators. Addition-
ally, the auto-configuration support offered by IPv6 
negates the need for services with higher administration 
costs, such as DHCP. 
The architecture also provides scalability for larger 
networks. As the access control is enforced by the access 
router (at the first hop of the wireless network), this 
distributes the load of access control throughout the 
network. 
Finally, the fact that the wireless cells are routed rather 
than bridged results in less broadcast traffic on those cells 
(thus improving network utilisation). In turn, this also 
improves the security of the network, as it makes it far 
more difficult for users to snoop packets or masquerade as 
other network nodes (in the case of a fully routed network, 
both the attacker and target must be co-located within the 
same cell, making the attacker much easier to discover 
and track). 
 
3.1.2. Host Mobility. Although there are clearly many 
advantages to be gained from having a fully routed 
network, it does add more complexity to the mobility 
management subsystem of the network. Consider the case 
of a mobile device roaming between various flavours of 
network within the Testbed. As the mobile node crosses 
an administrative boundary between districts, it sees a 
change in its IPv6 point of attachment. We envision that 
these administrative boundaries will be highly common-
place, separating areas with differing access control 
settings. They could be as often as different offices/ 
laboratories within a building, and different shops within a 
city. It is therefore vital that the transition between 
districts is handled smoothly and quickly by the infra-
structure. We use Mobile IPv6 to enable this roaming 
between cells, which provides us with the necessary loca-
tion independence and transparency, a distributed mobility 
management architecture and good handoff performance 
[11]. However, this adds an additional requirement onto 
the access control architecture – any authentication or 
access control mechanisms must not interfere with the 
performance of the handoff between districts. 
 
3.2. Access Control Mechanism 
 
The access control mechanism proposed for the Mobile 
IPv6 testbed is based on the principles of packet marking 
and packet filtering. Data packets are tagged on the client 
terminal through an extension to the network stack before 
they leave the node. Based on presence and credentials 
associated with the packet marking, access to the trusted 
network (i.e., public Internet or value-added service 
networks) is granted or denied. 
The key components of our access control architecture 
are described here. Figure 1 illustrates how they are 
situated within our network infrastructure. 
• The Authentication Server (AS) is responsible for 
the authentication and authorisation of clients on 
the access network. Upon successful authentication 
and authorisation of a user, the AS issues a limited 
lifetime access token to the user. 
• User end-terminals (i.e., handheld devices, laptops, 
etc.) request the authorisation of the node on behalf 
of the current user and perform the packet marking 
for outbound traffic. A valid access token is 
obtained from the AS upon successful authorisation 
of the user. The access token, in turn, provides the 
basis for the packet marking.  
• Access Routers (ARs) control the access to the 
protected network. They block traffic originating 
from or sent to unauthorised end-terminals based 
on network-level packet filtering. Co-locating the 
ARs directly with the base stations enables highly 
flexible access control close to the user (thus mini-
mizing the area which can be targeted by an unau-
thorized attacker). 
• The Gateway connects the access network with the 
public Internet or a private Intranet (i.e., Campus 
network). It is concerned with external security 
threats from arbitrary nodes on the public network 
and is an extension of the firewall concept. 
The remainder of this section explains step-by-step, 
how our access control mechanism operates (see also 
Figure 2 for an illustration of the procedure). 
 
3.2.1. Account Creation. In order to access a publicly 
accessible network guided with our access control system, 
a user’s end-terminal requires our Mobile IPv6 stack 
extension. The user downloads and installs the extension 
at account setup time.1 The user’s secret credentials (i.e., 
username and password) are created and registered with 
the authentication server. The user is also assigned a 
group, which defines the level of service granted to the 
user. For example, groups have individual access profiles 
in terms of which cells they can access (i.e., at what times, 
and how long or frequently).  
In future, we plan to support service differentiation in 
terms of QoS (i.e., different priority levels, data rate limi-
tations, payload volume restrictions) based on the group 
affiliation.  
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 It should be noted here that our extension does not impact the 
“normal” use of the Mobile IPv6 stack in conventional networks.  
3.2.2. Session Initialisation. Before a user can access the 
network, the end-terminal requires a valid access token in 
order to tag packets for transit via the access routers. As a 
result, the user will be prompted to enter his username and 
password during session initialisation (for example, when 
the device is turned on in a cell or at initial network 
entrance). This process occurs only once per login session 
as the credentials are cached for the duration of a session. 
 
3.2.3. User Authentication. User authentication is 
carried out between the user’s end terminal (e.g. PDA or 
laptop) and the authentication server. The client software 
takes care of authentication of the user currently logged 
in. 
The authentication request sent from an end terminal to 
the authentication server includes the user’s username and 
password, the node’s MAC Address and IPv6 Address, 
and a secret session key. While the username and pass-
word are required to authenticate the user, the MAC and 
IP addresses are needed to authorise the client node on the 
access routers. As further discussed below, the session key 
is needed for the encryption of the access tokens, to avoid 
address spoofing attacks with the network. 
In order to prohibit malicious users from spoofing the 
secret credentials of other users or a session key, the 
authentication request message must be encrypted. We use 
public key encryption based on the RSA [12] algorithm 
and the standard IPsec encryption header [13] in order to 
avoid the need for a secure key exchange mechanism and 
a special protocol extension. Public key encryption is 
advantageous as the client must know only the public key 
of the authentication server (which can be statically 
configured) and not vice versa. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Illustration of access control protocol in 
chronological order starting with user authentication, 
followed by access control list update and concluding 
with the packet marking and filtering. 
3.2.4. Token Generation. Access tokens are the secret 
credentials that grant packets from authorised end termi-
nals access to the protected network. The tokens are 
issued to particular users upon successful authentication 
and authorisation.  
However, passing the access tokens in clear text to the 
client would allow malicious users in the same cell to 
snoop valid tokens. As a consequence, to fully secure the 
access control mechanism even against MAC address 
spoofing, the access token requires encryption. The shared 
session key passed within the authentication request is 
used for the encryption of the authentication response 
message. 
In order to avoid brute force attacks on access tokens, 
we chose to restrict the lifetime of the access tokens to a 
configurable time interval, referred to as the expiration 
time of a token. Beyond this interval the extended proto-
col stack must refresh the node’s authorisation based on 
the cached user credentials to request a new token. 
Since the access token is simply a pseudo-random 
value that is large enough to make it hard to guess or 
discover by a brute force search within the lifetime of the 
token, the expiration time must reflect the size of the 
access token.2  The refresh time of the authentication 
protocol must be sufficiently smaller than the expiration 
time.3  
The main advantage of those short-lived access tokens 
is that they provide extra security and robustness. The fact 
that they change so frequently make them hard to crack. 
 
3.2.5. Packet Marking. End terminals use packet mark-
ing as a technique to indicate authorised packets to the 
access routers. When the Mobile IPv6 stack forwards a 
packet, it includes our access control extension within the 
Hop-by-Hop Option extension header of the IPv6 packet 
as illustrated in Figure 3. This header contains the access 
token and a checksum besides usual housekeeping infor-
mation (i.e., protocol version and encryption type). The 
token and checksum are both encrypted using the session 
key associated with the access token. The checksum is 
required as a measure against replay attacks. It prevents a 
potential attacker from simply snooping the extension 
header and adding it to their own data. 
Since the extension header must be attached to all data 
packets, a very lightweight encryption mechanism is 
required. We therefore use a symmetric cipher in order to 
avoid the performance overhead of asymmetric crypto-
graphic algorithms. 
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 Since we encrypt the 32-bit access token together with a 96-bit 
checksum, we currently use a 10 minute expiration time. 
3
 We suggest a refresh time that equals to: T
refres = min{Texpiration – 2 ¯ 
avg( T
authentication ), ¯ Texpiration} 
 
Figure 3.  The Access Control Extension Header is 
added to the IPv6 packets as part of the Hop-by-Hop 
Option header – A 4-bit version and type field is used 
to indicate the protocol version and encryption type,   
and a 128-bit field to hold the access credential: 
EKs{access token, checksum}. 
3.2.6. Packet Filtering. The access control mechanism 
described so far is based on network-level packet filtering. 
Access routers check packets sent to and from the end 
terminals for authorisation. While packets sent to the 
wireless network must have the destination address of an 
authorised end terminal, packets sent from a client node 
must carry a valid access token.  
For this, each access router maintains an access control 
list (ACL) that accommodates all the filter information 
required to identify ‘authorised’ packets, namely the MAC 
address, IPv6 address, access token, and session key for 
each authorised end terminal. The access routers receive 
this information from the authentication server when a 
user of the cell successfully authenticates with the 
network.  
When a packet is received from the wireless network, 
the access router looks up the MAC address in the ACL. 
If an entry for the end-terminal exists, the access router 
verifies the IPv6 source address. In the case of a match, it 
decrypts the access token and checksum using the session 
key (held within the ACL) and validates its content 
against the ACL. When successful, the Hop-by-Hop 
Option containing the access control extension header is 
stripped off and the packet is passed on. Packets that fail 
any of those tests (for example, due to an unknown MAC 
address, a wrong IPv6 address match, or an invalid or 
expired token) are dropped. One exception to this rule is 
that when a client is first seen in a cell, it is allowed to 
contact certain well-known IPv6 addresses; this allows 
nodes to initially communicate with the authentication 
server. 
In order to quickly recover from missing ACL entries 
due to packet loss or a router crash, the access router indi-
cates failure immediately, such that the client can re-
authenticate right away. To prevent malicious users from 
trying to gain unauthorised access to the network, we plan 
to add a mechanism to black list malicious users who 
repeatedly send packets with invalid IP addresses or 
access tokens (for example, through link-layer access 
restriction). 
The soft-state authentication protocol facilitates fine-
grained access control with respect to time and location. It 
allows end-terminals to be restricted to certain districts 
based on time. Furthermore, the soft-state approach eases 
the withdrawal of access privileges. For example, a user 
who is caught using the network in an inappropriate way 
or who runs out of online time credit can be denied access 
to the network by simply refusing further access tokens 
refreshes.  
 
3.2.7. Roaming Support. In networks such as ours, 
support for roaming users that frequently move between 
microcellular networks is crucial. From a network-level 
point of view, roaming support (i.e., location transparency 
and fast network handoffs) is provided through the Mobile 
IPv6 protocol. With respect to our access control archi-
tecture, we therefore focus on minimising the impact of 
access control on handoff performance.  
When a mobile node moves into a new network cell, it 
acquires a new care-of-address (CoA) to reflect its new 
physical network location4. As a result of the network 
handoff, the network access will also be controlled by a 
different access router, which may have no knowledge of 
previous authorisations for the mobile node. Unfortu-
nately, our current solution could take up to several 
minutes (i.e., until the next authentication refresh is 
carried out) before the mobile node would obtain access 
to the network again.  
Since service disruptions of this order are clearly not 
acceptable for networks such as the Mobile IPv6 testbed, 
we introduced three special measures: 
1. Mobile nodes immediately initiate a fresh authenti-
cation cycle for the node’s new IPv6 address 
immediately after a network handoff.  
2. The authentication server sends the periodic ACL 
updates not only to the client’s access router, but 
also to the neighbouring access routers in order to 
‘preheat’ their access control lists with authorisa-
tions for potential roaming clients. Note that with 
the emergence of the context transfer protocol [14] 
currently being discussed within the IETF, we 
consider using this ‘proactive’ means to transfer 
ACL state from previous to new access routers. 
3. Access routers grant a short reprieve time for roam-
ing nodes entering a cell, before they block traffic 
from the node. This technique preserves safety by 
granting access to packets based on a node’s 
previous authorisation. Due to the preheating of the 
neighbouring access routers, a node’s new access 
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 This can be achieved either through DHCP (v4/v6) or the auto-
configuration mechanisms of IPv6. 
router will already have an entry in its access 
control list when the node moves into its coverage 
area. This allows packets with a valid MAC 
address and access token to pass for the period of 
the reprieve time. However, if the router does not 
receive a fresh access list update for the node’s new 
IPv6 address before the reprieve time expires, traf-
fic will be blocked. 
These extensions have the advantage that they do not 
interfere with or slow down network-level handoffs. The 
initial user authentication required when entering a new 
district is simply delayed (i.e. carried out in the back-
ground) to avoid extra latency.  
The reprieve time must be chosen carefully. On the one 
hand, the interval should be minimal as it gives provi-
sional access to users based on their previous authorisa-
tion while, on the other hand, it must be long enough to 
complete a whole authorisation cycle.5  
 
3.2.8. Core Network Protection. The design of our 
access control architecture assumes that the core network 
can be trusted. This assumption seems reasonable, since 
the access routers and the authentication server typically 
belong to the same administrative domain. In our network, 
for example, the access routers are physically protected by 
locked cabinets in buildings not open to the general 
public, and the physical links from the access routers back 
to the campus network are hard to intercept. However, in 
case we identify fraudulent misuse within the core 
network or in network segments that are not trusted, we 
fall back to use end-to-end encryption for communication 
between the authentication server and the access routers. 
For this, standard public key encryption as supported by 
IPsec [13] is recommended. 
In addition, we plan to use the gateway router (Figure 
1) as a firewall for the core network. For security reasons 
and to avoid denial-of-service attacks, it will strictly block 
remote traffic (sourced from the public network) directly 
sent to the access routers. To minimise the risk of denial-
of-service attacks on the clients, the gateway could poten-
tially rate-control transmissions to end-terminals. 
 
3.2.9. Enhanced Security. In cases where users demand 
a high level of security (for example, full privacy), the 
architecture supports an additional layer of protection 
based on full encryption of the payload on the wireless 
link (i.e., between the access router and client device). 
This offers an alternative to the IEEE 802.11 wired 
equivalent privacy (WEP) [8] protocol, which has recently 
been shown to be vulnerable to attack [15]. We plan to 
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 We recommend a reprieve time of approximately 2-5 seconds 
depending on the network performance and authentication server. 
allow the user to freely choose the level of security 
depending on the network use and the end-terminal at 
hand, as full payload encryption can be very heavyweight 
for low-performance mobile devices. 
Finally, it is worth noting that standard IPsec authenti-
cation and encryption are entirely complementary to our 
access control architecture. They can be used in addition 




This section outlines the implementation of the key 
components of our access control architecture for the 
wireless network around Lancaster. Due to the lack of 
space, we provide only a brief description here. 
 
4.1. Client Software 
 
According to our architecture the client software is 
responsible for user authentication and packet marking.  
User authentication is performed by a system service 
executed on the end-terminal. In order to gain access to 
the network, the user must first provide its username and 
password to the terminal. The credentials are then stored 
locally such that the actual authentication (and periodic 
re-authentication) with the authentication server can be 
performed by the service without user intervention. 
The authentication protocol used for client authentica-
tion with the AS is based on a lightweight request/ 
response protocol. UDP is used for transport. Standard 
IPsec encryption6 is applied for end-to-end encryption of 
the authentication request.7 The clients use RSA [12] 
public-key encryption based on the public key of the 
authentication server (which can be pre-configured at the 
client to avoid the need for a key distribution service) to 
encrypt the authentication request. 
As described earlier, the authentication request 
includes a new session key for the authentication server to 
establish a secure communication channel back to the 
client. For the encryption of the authentication response, 
we use symmetric encryption based on the shared session 
key. This is accomplished via the tiny encryption algo-
rithm (TEA) [16].  
In response to an authentication request, the server 
replies either with a new access token for the client or an 
error message. In the case of success, the client service 
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 Since the requirement to support IPsec in Mobile IPv6 has been 
dropped while we were designing our protocol, we may have to use a 
proprietary end-to-end encryption solution in the future. 
7
 For this to work in the absence of a global public key 
infrastructure, we statically configure the security association (SA) for 
the authentication server on the client. Based on this SA, IPv6 knows 
how to encrypt/decrypt data packets send to or received from the 
authentication server. 
decrypts the authentication response using the current 
session key and passes the token to the protocol stack for 
the packet marking.  
As highlighted earlier, our extended protocol stack also 
perform the packet marking, including the most recent 
access token into every packet (see Figure 3) to indicate 
the client’s access credentials to the access routers. To 
prevent MAC address spoofing and replay attacks based 
on a spied access token, we encrypt the token along with a 
packet checksum (using the shared session key). The 96-
bit checksum is computed from frequently changing 
protocol fields of the IPv6 header (namely the source and 
destination address, flow id, and, payload length), the 
transport protocol header (namely the source and destina-
tion port, and checksum), and limited data of the payload 
using MD5 [16]. In order to minimise the latency due to 
encryption of the access credentials, we use the fast block 
cipher TEA [17]. The lightweight algorithm has no known 
cryptanalysis and is claimed to be at least as secure as the 
well-known IDEA cipher. 
We have chosen to use the Mobile IPv6 protocol stack 
as a starting point to add the extra functionality required 
for packet marking because of the experience we have 
gained with this protocol stack in recent years. In particu-
lar, we support the protocol stacks for Microsoft Windows 
2000 and Linux, since we have implemented both stacks 
within previous projects at Lancaster [18,19]. 
 
4.2. Authentication Server 
 
The authentication server runs a user-level application 
or service responsible for managing the user accounts, and 
the authentication and authorisation of the users and their 
terminals.   
Upon receipt of an authentication request (on the well-
known server port), the authentication application tries to 
authenticate the user. On success, it sends the authentica-
tion response message including the access token back to 
the client and triggers the dissemination of the access 
control list update to the respective active router(s). 
The authentication server uses a standard Mobile IPv6 
stack with support for IPsec in order to provide the cryp-
tographic means for the encrypted communication channel 
to the end-terminals (and potentially the access routers). A 
dynamic mechanism to add and remove IPsec security 
associations will be provided to allow the authentication 
service to flexibly define how authentication messages are 
encrypted (and decrypted respectively).8 
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 More specifically, a global SA for datagrams received from any of 
the end-terminals is needed to instruct IPsec to decrypt the message 
using the server’s private key, whereas individual SAs for every client 
are required to define outbound message to be encrypted based on the 
current session key (shared between the client and AS). 
For the transport of our application-level authentication 
protocol we use UDP. Since the authentication protocol is 
fairly lightweight (i.e. only small amounts of data are 
exchanged), it does not justify the overhead of establish-
ing separate TCP sessions for each authentication cycle. 
Reliability is achieved by means of a simple client driven 
retransmission strategy.  
Although the use of UDP for the transport benefits 
scalability of the authentication server, the bottleneck in 
our architecture is still the centralised server. To over-
come this limitation, we plan to exploit the new IPv6 
feature anycast. This novel addressing scheme enables 
replication of servers behind a single anycast address to 
increase availability and redundancy. 
 
4.3. Access Router and Gateway 
 
The access routers and the gateway firewall are based 
on the LARA++ active router architecture [10]. LARA++ 
is a component-based active router platform that supports 
dynamic extensibility of the router functionality through 
remote loading and on-the-fly instantiation of active 
components. A sophisticated composition framework 
enables flexible integration of these components into the 
packet processing chain on the router, where they provide 
additional functionality. 
Initially, the packet filtering and access control list 
management will be implemented as active LARA++ 
components. The ACL management component listens for 
ACL updates (i.e., UDP datagrams sent to a well-known 
port on the router) and updates its access control list 
accordingly. The packet filter component in comparison 
intercepts inbound traffic (originating from the end-termi-
nals) to verify their access credentials. If valid, the filter 
component removes the Hop-by-Hop Option including the 
access control extension header and forwards the packet; 
otherwise it drops the packets. Outbound traffic, in 
contrast, is intercepted to check whether or not it is 
destined to authorised clients. 
The gateway router will include a number of active 
components that attempt to secure the access network 
from malicious external nodes. These components will try 
to detect denial-of-service attacks (for example, ping 
floods) by external nodes based on packet analysis (i.e., 
packet type, source address, data rate, etc.). 
 
5. Related Work 
 
The design of our architecture has drawn on the 
experience of earlier public access control research. In 
particular, we have combined a range of existing ideas 
with our own expertise in active and mobile networking 
and protocol design to develop a flexible, lightweight, 
scalable and secure access control solution with special 
support for mobile environments.  
Two early access control systems, namely Carnegie 
Mellon’s NetBar system [20] and the public access system 
developed at UC Berkeley [21], use specialised hardware 
(i.e. hubs, switches) to control network access on a port 
basis. Both solutions dynamically enable or disable link-
layer access to network ports based on user authentication. 
While CMU’s NetBar system is based on a remote 
configurable VLAN switch, Berkeley’s solution relies on 
an intelligent hub. Despite the fact that both solutions 
require expensive specialized hardware, they are not 
practical for wireless networks, where many end-terminals 
share the same base station and hence the same network 
port on the switch/hub. 
A more promising hardware-centric approach was 
recently announced by the IEEE 802.1X standardisation 
body. The port-based network access control [22] 
performs layer 2 authentication of the host to obtain 
access to a switch LAN by means of the extensible 
authentication protocol (EAP). This approach provides 
per-port access control at the first point of attachment (the 
edge). The fact that our infrastructure is based on micro-
cellular layer 3 networks, which can exactly correspond to 
the link-layer cells, allows our solution to support access 
control at the same granularity than port-based network 
access control.  
The systems described above are all limited to address 
a single aspect, namely access control. Our architecture in 
comparison is provisioned to address supplementary 
aspects of a public access infrastructure, such as account-
ing, quality of service, monitoring, or detection of security 
attacks.  Especially the use of dynamically extensible 
active routers inside the access network provides great 
flexibility for future integration of additional functionality 
and services as they are needed or being developed. 
However, the major difference to the access control 
approach introduced so far is probably that our architec-
ture performs access control at the network-layer rather 
than the link-layer. The advantage of layer 3 access 
control is that it can be used as a uniform mechanism 
across many link-layer technologies. Current link-layer 
access control solutions are still predominantly based on 
the idiosyncrasies of the technology at hand, although 
standardisation efforts are under way. 
Two further network-level access control systems we 
are aware of are Standford’s SPINACH system [23] and 
Microsoft’s CHOICE [24]. Both have been fully deployed 
in a real environment. The early SPINACH system 
controls network access simply based on the address pair 
(IP, MAC) of successfully authenticated users. This 
approach cleverly reuses the existing infrastructure with-
out the need for additional hardware or specialised client 
software, but at the cost of inferior security (i.e., no meas-
ures against MAC address spoofing). The more recent 
CHOICE system in comparison accomplishes a high-level 
of security through the concept packet marking and packet 
filtering. Successfully authenticated and authorised users 
receive a token at session initialisation time. A custom 
network device driver on the client attaches the tag to 
every outbound data packet to indicate its authorisations. 
The architecture involves separate authoriser and verifier 
gateways in addition to a central authentication server. 
While the authoriser gateway enables restricted access to 
the authenticator only, the verifier gateway grants full 
access to the network based on the packet tags.  
Although based on the same access control principles, 
our approach distinguishes itself from CHOICE in a 
number of ways. Three key differences are: First, we 
introduce the concepts of short-lived access tokens and 
session keys, and a soft-state authentication protocol to 
enhance robustness and security. The fact that the user’s 
security credentials (tokens and keys) are frequently 
renewed enables the use of lighter weight crypto systems 
without sacrificing security. Second, our access control 
architecture accounts for smooth handoffs between layer 3 
networks. Our approach is therefore not restricted to link-
layer handoffs and a single layer 3 network, which makes 
our architecture more scalable than CHOICE. Third, we 
introduce the concept of microcellular administrations 
(referred to as districts) to enable fine-grained access 
control, accounting and monitoring, which considerably 
improves flexibility (for example, a wide range of access 
policies and accounting models can be implemented). 
Furthermore, unlike CHOICE and SPINACH, our 
architecture does not rely on the availability of other high-
level services, such as DHCP for auto-configuration of the 
client terminals and HTTP (and SSL) for Web-based user 
authentication. Instead, our clients use the standard IPv6 
auto-configuration mechanism to obtain a network 
address, IPsec encryption to secure the authentication 
protocol, an extension to the Mobile IPv6 stack to accom-
plish packet tagging, and a lightweight request/response 
authentication protocol (based on UDP). 
Finally, our system will allow standard IPv6 applica-
tions to run over the public access infrastructure. In order 
to overcome the problem of limited IPv6 support in 
current applications, we are working simultaneously on an 
IPv4 in IPv6 encapsulation protocol, which enables the 
use of unmodified legacy IPv4 applications over an IPv6 




This paper introduced an innovative access control 
architecture, designed for metropolitan area public access 
wireless networks. The network infrastructure and access 
control mechanism described offers a number of impor-
tant distinguishing features from other related approaches: 
• Support for fine-grained access control: The use of 
IPv6 to provide microcellular administrative 
boundaries (districts) enables the enforcement of 
sophisticated multifaceted access control policies. 
In addition to temporal information, access control 
policies can also comprise spatial information (i.e., 
which cell(s) a user has access to at certain times). 
• Scalable access control infrastructure: The parti-
tioning of the public network infrastructure into 
many separate administrative districts and the 
distribution of access control processing load 
across multiple access routers constitutes a system 
scalable to a large number of users, terminals and 
cells. Also, the integration of the overlay network 
concept allows for the scalable provision of access 
networks to users. 
• Highly secure access control: The use of soft-state 
based authorisation (in conjunction with the peri-
odic authentication protocol) offers a high level of 
security, as secret credentials (i.e. access tokens, 
session keys) are re-issued at a configurable inter-
val. This greatly reduces the risk of brute force or 
spoofing attacks. 
• Optimised access control for roaming users: 
Support for roaming users in mobile environment is 
inherent to the architecture. A short reprieve time 
combined with intelligent distribution of ACL state 
information among access routers enables smooth 
network handoffs between access districts. 
In addition, our access control implementation is novel 
for a number of technical reasons including the use of 
Mobile IPv6 to support public access control and the use 
of active router technology to speed up the development 
and continued refinement of the system. The tight integra-
tion of the access control system with our Mobile IPv6 
stacks allows for a system which adapts quickly to 
changes in network environment (such as handoffs), while 
maintaining location transparency for applications and a 
high level of security. The use of LARA++, our compo-
nent-based active router, is expected to be an ideal plat-
form for the packet filtering component and ultimately for 
further network management services such as accounting 
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